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COMMNTS
LOSS OF ACCESS-A BIGHT TO BE COMPENSATED
Until recently, conventional two-way unrestricted access highways
were sufficiently adequate to meet the demands of highway travel.
Increased population and traffic congestion, however, has necessitated
the development of non-access or limited access highways1 to provide
a faster and safer means of travel.2 This development has given birth
to a conflict of interest-a conflict which has produced a volume of
litigation involving clashes between landowners seeking to vindicate
their rights in the abutting street or highway and governmental
agencies attempting to meet the ever increasing demands for more
and better highways.3 Resolution of this conflict necessitates a con-
sideration of the age-old problem of balancing the rights of the general
public against the rights of the individual. If every access right is
to be compensated, the general public's desire for the construction of
modem highway facilities may be frustrated by lack of funds. On
the other hand, if a landowner's right to access, a recognized property
right, can be taken without full compensation the private interest
in distributive justice will be severely offended.
4
1 KENTucKy REVISED STATUTES [hereinafter KRS] § 177.220, defines a 'limited
access facility" as:
... [A] highway or street especially designed for through traffic, and one,
from or to which owners or occupants of abutting land or other persons
have no right or easement, or only a limited right or easement of access ...
by reason of the fact that their property abuts upon such limited access
faci....
2 Comment, Control of Access by Frontage Roads-Police Power or Eminent
Domain, 11 KAN. L. REv. 388 (1962-3).
3 A thorough account of the conflict of interest between the abutting landowner
and the general public is provided in R. NETERTON, CONTROL OF I-GHMvAY Ac-
CESS 35-59 (1963) [hereinafter cited as NETMRTON]. See also, Covey, Control of
Highway Access, 88 NEB. L. REv. 407 (1959); Covey, Highway Protection through
Control of Access and Roadside Development, 1959 Wis. L. REv. 567 (1959);
Cromwell, Loss of Access to Highways: Different Approaches to the Problem of
Compensation 48 VA. L. REv. 538 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Cromwell]; May-
berry and Aloi, Compensation for Loss of Access in Eminent Domain in New York:
A Re-Evaluation of the No-Compensation Rule with a Proposal for Change, 16
BuFFALO L. REv. 603 (1966-67) [hereinafter cited as Mayberry and Aloil; Astyne,
Just Compensation of Intangible Detriment: Criteria For Legislative Modi cations
In California, U.C.L.A. L. REv. 491 (1968-69) [hereinafter cited as Alstynel]; Stoe-
buck, The Property Right of Access Versus The Power of Eminent Domain, 47
TFzx. L. REv. 733 (1968-69) [hereinafter cited as Stoebuck]; Note, California and
the Right of Access: The Dilemma over Compensation, 38 S. CAL. L. REV. 689
(1965); Note, Control of Access By Frontage Roads-Police Power or Eminent
Domain?, 11 KAN. L. REv. 388 (1963).
4 In Bacich v. Board of Control, 144 P.2d 818 (Cal. 1943), the Supreme Court
of California undertook to explain why access exists as a species of property-
namely, because the courts have so recognized it. In Stubbs, Access Rights of an
Abutting Landowner, in 5 SouTmvEsnN LiEGAL FoUNDA-moNs INsTrTrTE ON
EmnENTr DOMAIN 59 (1963), it was emphasized that:
... the overwhelming weight of authority is that the owner of land
(Continued on next page)
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, This comment, though containing a certain degree of empirical
analysis and classification of loss of access decisions, will be primarily
concerned with the judicial response to the conflict between landowner
and general public and the policies underlying that response.
Any analysis of the current state of the law must of necessity be
prefaced by a cursory discussion of the distinction between the police
and eminent domain powers.;
The power of eminent domain involves "the right of the state,
through its regular organization, to reassert, either temporarily or
permanently, its dominion over any portion of the soil of the state on
account of public exigency and for the public good."6 In other words,
it is a constitutional power to take private property for public use.
7
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
abutting on a street or highway has a private right in such street or high-
way distinct from that of the public, which cannot be taken or materially
impaired without just compensation. Access to the highway is one of
these private rights and is a property right....
An unusually forceful expression of the notion is illustrated in Sweet v. Irriga-
tion Canal Co., 254 P.2d 700, 712 (Ore. 1953) where the court said:
[An abutting owner is entitled to the use of the highway in front of his
premises to its full width as a means of ingress and egress. . . and this
right is as much property as the soil within the boundaries of his lot....
More typical judicial phraseology can be found in Hillerage v. City of Scotts-
bluff, 83 N.W.2d 76, 84 (Neb. 1957), where the Court wrote:
[T]he right of an owner of property abutting on a street to ingress and
egress to and from his premises by way of such street is a property right
in the nature of an easement in the street which the owner of abutting
property has, not in common with the public generally ...
For a thorough analysis of the development of access as a property right see
NETHERToN 35-59. See generally 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain §§ 105, 122, and
167 (1965); 89 C.J.S. Highways § 141 (1944).
5 This is pointed out in Note, Compensation Claims for Losses of Access Rights
to Interstate Highways, 14 DEPAuL L. REv. 130, 131 (1964):
The controversy over compensation for the extinguishment or substantial
impairment of [access rights] is based upon a decision as to whether such
limitation should be compensated through the state's eminent domain
power, or whether the state is exercising its right to regulate traffic, in
which case it is exercising its 'police power' in such a way that com-
pensation is not required.
6
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONAnY 616 (4th ed. 1951).
7 The power of eminent domain is incorporated into the Ky. CONST. in art. I §
13. In contrast to the provision of the U.S. CONST. (the fifth amendment), the
Kentucky provision is much broader in scope. Kentucky is one of thirty-one states
to follow the initiative of the 1870 Illinois legislature which recognized a basic
principle of property law. "'Property" denotes, not the physical thing land, but
rather certain jurally enforced rights and privileges arising out of the relation of an
owner or another having an interest in land. It follows from this principle that
the right to compensation arising from the exercise of eminent domain need not
be confined to 'physical takings," but could arise anytime there is a damaging
of property interests. The Illinois Constitution thus provided that compensation
was necessary whenever there was a "taking" or "damaging" of property rights.
The similar Kentucky provision compels "just compensation for property taken,
injured, or destroyed." For a listing of the states adopting the "or damaging"
principle, see Stoebuck, supra note 3, at 734 n.2; Cromwell, supra note 3, at
548-54.
(Continued on next page)
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In contrast, the police power is not utilized to take property in the
physical sense, but rather is used only to regulate.8 It has been defined
as "an inherent attribute of sovereignty through which the state acts
to protect or promote public welfare."9
Although the two powers differ in theory, when judicially applied
to issues concerning access rights, their distinctions tend to become
somewhat blurred.10 The resulting interchangeability of the two
powers with respect to governmental impingement of access rights
does not appear crucial until one realizes that the exercise of eminent
domain has the concomitant obligation to compensate while the
exercise of the police power does not. The unfortunate fact is that the
police power rubric is often employed to justify a denial of compensa-
tion where there has been a partial deprivation of access resulting in
depreciation of property value. Initially this justification appears
valid, for as a leading scholar has noted:
As a device for ordering traffic flow, improving traffic safety, and
reducing traffic accidents, the freeway undeniably constitutes an
expanded, albeit indirect, exercise of the police power."
It is difficult, however, to rationalize the cases in terms of the
police power when the so-called regulation may and often does strip
the property of much of its economic worth.1
2
The diversity of legal opinion over the compensability for restriction
and deprivation of access rights is thus grounded in the police power-
(Footnote continued tfrom preceding page)
In Alstyne, supra note 3, at 493, it is suggested that the persistence of easement
of access as a basis for relief:
[lilt is undoubtedly due, at least in part, to the historical fact that the
'or damaged' clause introduced into state constitutional provisions assuring
payment of just compensation' were intentionally designed by their nine-
teenth century framers to afford protection for such interests as access
right.
8 The basic distinction between the police power and eminent domain is noted
in 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 6 (1965); Kucera, Eminent Domain Versus Police
Power: A Common Misconception, in 1965 SouTHwxsnnm LEGAL FouNrDAToN's
INSTIrrTE ON EzmNENT Do Nmw 1; Note, The Police Power and the Right to Com-
pensation, 3 HAnv. L. REv. 189 (1889).
9 Mayberry and Aloi, supra note 3, at 624.
'0 See CRAIG, Regulation and Purchase: The Governmental Ways to Attain
Planned Land Use, in LAw Am LA_, : ANGLO-AmECAN PLANNiNG PacarcE (C.
Harr ed. 1964), contends that the differences between eminent domain and police
power are practically extinct and that old tests are no longer dependable.
11 Alstyne, supra note 3, at 507. See NErHERTON 78-81 which indicates that
control of highway access promotes multiple objectives (e.g., expediting traffic
flow, protecting highway investment, controlling roadside improvements, balancing
transportation facilities, promoting safety and achieving community amenity) that
are consistent with advancement of public welfare.
12 See Dep't of Highways v. Rosenblatt, 416 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1967); Dep't
of Highways v. Carlisle, 363 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1962).
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eminent domain dichotomy.18 So framed, the determination of whether
an enforced conversion to indirect access (of what was theretofore
direct access) entitles an abutter to compensation depends upon
whether the police power or the eminent domain power prevails. 14
The trend has been to broaden the scope of the police power at the
expense of the eminent domain power.15 Nowhere is this trend more
evident than in those cases which hold that limited-access highways
are created to regulate the flow of traffic, thus promoting traffic safety,
and are therefore an exercise of the state's police power.'6 This line
of authority demonstrates how the police power approach, when
mechanically applied, can lead to irrational results. As a noted author
has suggested:
[Clonvenience of through vehicular traffic and the safety of
travelers along the highway merit substantial consideration....
[T]he serving of these purposes cannot be dignified to the extent
of defeating the rights of the landowner without his being com-
pensated. Ease and facility of access constitute valuable property
rights for which the owner is entitled to be adequately compen-
sated.17
It is unfortunate that courts have turned to a classification of legal
doctrine in terms of this police power-eminent domain dichotomy. By
concentrating on the classification of problems, rather than attempting
13 See generally 16 Am. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 259 (1964); 16 C.J.S.
Constitutional Law § 174 (1956).
14 Note, Development of the Concept of Eminent Domain, 42 COLUm. L. REv.
596, 637 (1942); 1 NICHOLS, EMnsNTr DomAIN § 1.42 [17] (1964).
15 Id.
36 Riddle v. State Highway Commission, 339 P.2d 301 (Kan. 1959); Nick v.
State Highway Commission, 109 N.W.2d 71 (Wis. 1961); State Highway Commis-
sion v. Bingham, 231 S.W.2d 728 (Ark. 1960). These cases illustrate that regula-
tion rather than actual physical taking can have a primary economic impact on
property value. It therefore becomes essential to define the constitutional limita-
tions, if any, upon the police power basis for regulation. In Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (per Douglas J.), the police power was held so essential to
the orderly maintenance of government as to constitute the "least limitable" of
governmental powers. Once exercised, it was held to be well nigh conclusive in
its effect.
But Justice Holmes recognized that the police power did have its limits;
that regulation could be so severe as to amount to a taking and as such entitle the
private property owner to compensation. In Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260
U.S. 393, 415 (1922), he wrote:
[S]ome values are enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to
the police power. But obviously the implied limitation must have its
limits or the contract and due process clauses are gone. One fact for
consideration in determining such limits is the extent of the dimunition.
When it reaches a certain magnitude, in most, if not in all cases, there
must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to sustain the
act.... The general rule at least is that while property may be regulated
to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will he recognized as a
taking.
17 Stubbs, supra note 4. at 78.
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objective efforts to isolate and evaluate the competing governmental
and private interests involved, the courts have tended to obscure (or
evade) the basic issue, viz., "the extent to which governmentally
compelled indirect contributions to the general public welfare must
be justly compensated."18
A frequent judicial technique employed in cases litigating the
deprivation of access rights is to justify a "taking" or "damaging"
which results in decreased market value19 as a valid exercise of the
police power. A recent decision of the Kentucky Court of Appeals
is illustrative of both the conflict involved, and the judicial doctrines,
predicated upon the police power, to resolve that conflict.20
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Diuguid,21 the Court of
Appeals granted a Department of Highways petition for rehearing.
The jury had awarded $43,975.00 for a 0.14 acre tract of land adjacent
to U.S. Highway No. 227. The award was clearly excessive in terms
of market value of the taken property. However, in terms of damage
to the remaining property in the form of inconvenience, restriction of
access, and rerouting of traffic, the amount of damages awarded was
18 A]styne, supra note 3, at 492.
9 Esling and Johnson, Measuring Just Compensation for Partial Taking in
Illinois Eminent Domain Proceedings, 1966 ILL. L.F. 87, 103 (1966):
[T]he cases clearly indicate that some factors cannot be considered by the
.ury even though they may in fact alter the market value of the damaged
land. The problem essentially has been the refusal or inability of the
courts to decide realistically whether they have in mind compensation
based on the actual market value or based on the cost resulting from only
certain limited injuries to the property.
It was concluded at 112 that:
The very necessity of limiting compensation to proper elements is fre-
quently at odds with the principle that the measure of damages is the
change in the market value.
There are two measures of recovery in condemnation proceedings that result
in partial takings (e.g., takings of a small tract of land that deprives abutting land-
owners of direct access to highways). The first is the "value plus damage" rule
whereby the jury assesses separately the value of the portion taken and the damage
to the remainder and adds the two together. The second is the "before and after"
rule whereby the evidence at trial and the verdict are confined to the difference
in market value of the remaining tract before and after the partial taking.
The Kentucky Court of Appeals decided in Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways
v. Sherrod, 867 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963), that the statutes requiring use of the
"value plus damage" formula were invalid under the Kentucky Constitution
and adopted the "before and after" rule without qualification except as to loss of
access. If there is a complete loss of access it can be considered as a separate item
of damage and compensated accordingly. If there is a restriction of access and not
a complete deprivation, the " before and after" nile should be applicable but is
seldom applied. The courts deny consideration of reduction of market value
occasioned by the partial loss of access. They rely on the well established doctrine
that reasonable restriction of access is simply a non-compensable factor. See Com-
monwealth Dep't of Highways v. Jackson, 302 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1957); Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Carlisle, 363 S.W.2d 104 (Ky. 1962).2 o See Dep't of Highways v. Diguid, 469 S.W.2d 707 (Ky. 1971).
21 d.
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not unreasonable. But the Court, in granting the petition, denied
recognition of these factors by stating:
It is well established that reasonable restriction of access, rerouting
of public highways, and circuity of travel occasioned thereby are
legally not compensable.
22
That the judicial doctrine of denying compensation for reasonable
restriction of access is "well established" cannot be denied.23 It is
221d. at 708.
23 See, e.g., Department of Highways v. Carlisle, 442 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1969);
Dep't of Highways v. Butler, 438 S.W.2d 797 (Ky. 1969); Dep't of Highways v.
West, 432 S.W.2d 430 (Ky. 1968); Dep't of Highways v. Straban, 431 S.W.2d 871
(Ky. 1968); Snyder v. Dep't of Highways, 423 S.W.2d 890 (Ky. 1968); Dep't of
Highways v. Hess 420 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1967); Dep't of Highways v. Rosenblat
416 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1967); Dep't of Highways v. Woolun, 415 S.W.2d 83 (Ky.
1967); Rowland v. Dep't of Highways, 414 S.W.2d 880 (Ky. 1967); Proctor v.
Dep't of Highways, 412 S.W.2d 252 (Ky. 1967); Dep't of Highways v. Smith, 413
S.W.2d 72 (Ky. 1967); Dep't of Highways v. Cleveland, 407 S.W.2d 417 (Ky.
1966); Sloan v. Dep't of Highways, 405 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1966); Dep't of High-
ways v. Adkins, 396 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of Highways v. Callihan, 391
S.W.2d 374 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of Highways v. Shaw, 890 S.W.2d 161 (Ky. 1965);
Dep't of Highways v. Caudill, 388 S.W.2d 376 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of Highways v.
Conley, 386 S.W.2d 750 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of Highways v. Lawton 386 S.W.2d
466 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of Highways v. Mayes, 388 S.W.2d 125 (Ky. 1965); Dep't
of Highways v. Prewitt, 390 S.W.2d 898 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of Highways v.
Denny, 385 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1964); Dep't of Highways v. Yates, 383 S.W.2d
340 (Ky. 1964); Dep't of Highways v. Merrill, 383 S.W.2d 327 (Ky. 1964);
Dep't of Highways v. Lanter, 379 S.W.2d 748 (Ky. 1964); Cartee v. Dep't of
Highways, 374 S.W.2d 860 (Ky. 1964); Dep't of Highways v. Darch, 374 S.W.2d
490 (Ky. 1964); Dept of Highways v. Sherrod, 367 S.W.2d 844 (Ky. 1963);
Dep't of Highways v. Tyree, 365 S.W.2d 472 (Ky. 1963); Dept of Highways v.
Raybourne, 364 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1963); Dep't of Highways v. Carlisle, 363 S.W.2d104 (Ky. 1962); Dep't of Highways v. Jackson, 302 S.W.2ld 373 (Ky. 1957); Ex
Parte Commonwealth of Kentucky, 291 S.W.2d 814 (Ky. 1956);, Standiford Civic
Club v. Dep't of Highways, 289 S.W.2d 498 (Ky. 1956); c. Dep't of Highways v.Scott, 385 S.W.2d 330 (Ky. 1964).
The following decisions are from other jurisdictions supporting the same view
that limitation of access, so long as reasonable access to the highway systemremains, is not a taking by eminent domain, but is accomplished under the police
power and therefore not compensable. State v. Thelberg, 350 P.2d 988 (Ariz.
1960); People v. Ayon, 54 Cal.2d 217, 352 P.2d 519 (Cal. 1960); ayton v.
Department of Highways, 367 P.2d 899 (Cal. 1963); Clayton County v. Bilxps
Eastern Petroleum Company, 123 S.E.2d 187 (Ga. 1961); Department of Public
Works and Bldgs. v. Mabee, 174 N.E.2d 801 Gill. 1960); State v. Ensley, 164
N.E.2d 342 (nd. 1960); Iowa, State Highway Commission v. Smith, 82 N.W.2d
755 (Ia. 1957); Brock v. State Highway Commission, 4t04 P.2d 934 (Kan. 1965);State Department of Highways v. Mason, 229 So.2d 89 (La. 1969); LaCroix v.
Commonwealth. 205 N.E.2d 228 (Mass. 1965); Houg s v. Maekie, 137 N.W.2
289 (Mich. 1965); Hendrickson v. State, 127 N.W.2d 165 (Minn. 1964)
Fougerson v. Seward Co., 119 N.W.2d 298 (Neb. 1963); State Department of
Highways v. Linnecke, 468 P.2d 8 (Nev. 1970); Palisades Properties, Inc. v.
Brady, 191 A.2d 501 (N.. 1963); State v. Silva, 387 P.2d 595 (N.M. 1962); Slig
v. State, 217 N.Y.S.2d 33, 176 N.E.2d 59 (N.Y. 1961); Preston v. Weller, 191
N.E.2d 832 (Ohio 1962); State Highway Commission v. Burke, 265 P.2d 783 (Ore.
1954); Sullivan v. Mareello, 214 A.2d 181 (R.I. 1965); Archenhold Auto Supply
v. City of Waco, 396 S.W.2d 111 (Tex. 1965); State v. Fox, 332 P.2d 943 (Wash.
1958); State v. State Road Commission, 136 S.E.2d 314 (W. Va. 1963); Carazalla
v. State, 71 N.W.2d 276 (Wis. 1955).
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equally difficult to take issue with the fact that overwhelming judicial
precedent favors denying compensation for the rerouting of traffic 24
and circuity of travel occasioned thereby.2 5 But it does not follow
from the fact that these doctrines are well established by judicial
precedent that they are necessarily sound in principle.26 It is interesting
to note what John S. Palmore, a Judge of the Kentucky Court of
Appeals, has said with respect to the application of these doctrines: 27
Frankly, the law of eminent domain almost universally is too
restrictive. Dispossessed condemnees ought to be made whole,
regardless of market value concepts. They should be paid for mov-
ing expenses, damages to business, loss of access . . . and other
items of expense occasioned by the involuntary disruption of their
affairs.
28
These doctrines, in reality, are merely facile labels used by the courts
as a guise for decisions based upon a very acute matter of policy.29
Judge Palmore gives expression to that policy as he continues:
Perhaps the reluctance of the courts to move in that direction
[toward compensating restrictions of access] is founded on an
unspoken policy of protecting the public treasury. If so, it is just
as indefensible as the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The public
treasury ought not to be preserved by a process of discrimination
that is inconsistent with the principles under which it was cre-
ated.3 0
A clarification of the various doctrines is necessary before any
extensive analysis of underlying policy is attempted. As a matter of
expediency, the doctrines of diversion of traffic and circuity of travel
will be given a somewhat cursory examination. The doctrine of
24 Pike County v. Whittington, 81 So.2d 288 (Ala. 1955)- People v. Ricciardi,
144 P.2d 799 (Cal. 1944); State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960); State v.
Peterson, 328 P.2d 617 (Mont. 1958); Pennysaver Oil Co. v. State, 334 S.W.2d
546 (Tex. 1960).25 Dep 't of Highways v. Noe, 426 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1968); Dep't of Highways
v. Rosenblatt, 416 S.W.2d 754 (Ky. 1967); Dep't of Highways v. Garlner, 413
S.W.2d 80 (Ky. 1967); Dep't of Highways v. Whitledge, 406 S.W.2d 833 (Ky.
1966); Louisville v. Kerr, 403 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1966); Dep't of Highways v. Adkins,
396 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of Highways v. Burns, 394 S.W.2d 923 (Ky.
1965); Dep't of Highways v. Brown, 392 S.W.2d 50 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of High-
ways v. Fancher, 390 S.W.2d 164 (Ky. 1965); Dep't of Highways v. Jackson, 302
S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1957).
But see, Priestly v. State, 242 N.E.2d 827 (N.Y. 1968) where the court
awarded compensation in a circuity of travel case. It was held that:
The circuity of travel may be unsuitable access for the highest and best
use of the remaining property. . . . Id. at 828.2 6 See Mayberry and Aloi, supra note 3.
2 7 Palmore, Damages Recoverable in a Partial Taking, 21 Sw. L. REv. 740
(1967).
28 Id. at 750.
29 See Mayberry and Aloi, supra note 3, at 645.
30 Palmore, supra note 27, at 750.
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reasonable restriction of access, being far more controversial and
appearing in far more litigation, will be more closely analyzed.
Courts are reluctant to compensate circuity of travel31 and diversion
of traffic32 because of the underlying premise that such interferences
do not involve deprivation of property rights.33 The general rule is
that an abutting landowner has no property right in the free flow of
traffic past his property and thus, no compensation may be claimed
if traffic is diverted from his premises or made to travel a more
circuitous route.34  The Kentucky Court of Appeals typifies most
jurisdictions in that it distinguishes traffic flow from access rights.
In Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Carlisle,35 the Court stated:
[T]he benefit an abutting landowner may derive from the location
of a highway and the direction of the traffic courses thereon is not
a matter of right and does not come within the category of access
rights.36
31 Note, Compensation Claims for Losses of Access Rights to Interstate High-
ways, 14 DEPAuL L. REV. 130 (1964), defines circuity of travel as:
... the necessity of having to take a more roundabout route of travel to
reach the abutter's property. Id. at 132.
32 Diversion of traffic is defined as:
... the consequence of constructing a highway in such a way that traffic
is diverted from passing in front of an abutters property as it once did.
Id. at 132.
33 The argument is usually phrased in terminology similar to that used in
People v. licciardi, 23 Cal. 2d 390, 144 P.2d 799, 804 (1944):
We recognize that the defendants have no property right in any par-
ticular flow of traffic over the highway were rerouted or if another high-
way were constructed which resulted in a substantial amount of traffic
being diverted from that through highway the value of their property
might thereby be diminished, but in such event defendants would have
no right to compensation by reason of such re-routing or diversion of
traffic. The re-routing or diversion of traffic in such a case would be a
mere police power regulation, or the incidental result of a lawful act,
and not the taking or damaging of a property right.
See also Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Rosenblatt, 416 S.W.2d 104 (Ky.
1962); Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Carlisle, 363 S.W.2d 104 (Ky.
1962); Commonwealth, Dept of Highways v. Jackson, 302 S.W.2d 373 (Ky.
1957).
On occasion, in their enthusiasm for rationalizing bad doctrines, courts carry
their arguments to the point of absurdity and in so doing, leave them open to
criticism. See, e.g., Pike County v. Whittington, 81 So.2d 288, 295 (Ala. 1955),
where the court emphasized that:
Unless we can say that public roads are built primarily for the benefit of
the occasional landowner along the route, rather than for the necessity
and convenience of the general public, it must be said that the landowner
has no vested right in the current of public travel.3 4 It must be kept in mind that pervading this argument is the application
of the police power rationale. It is conceded that, when traffic is diverted from a
highway, decreased traffic flow may cause damage to an abutting landowner's
property value or business. This damage, however, is not compensable since the
sovereign, under the police power, may re-route, increase, or decrease the flow of
traffic on a public highway.
35 363 S.W.2d 104, 106 (Ky. 1962).
36 Id. at 35.
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The Court of Appeals is of the opinion that so long as the owner
of abutting property is given a connection with the public highway
system, no matter how circuitous, he has no right to compensationYl
The governing principle is that any increase in the value of a piece of
property because of its proximity to a public highway may be elimi-
nated without public liability, because such increase was attributable
to public expense.
38
A differing position, often criticized,39 views an abutter's interest
as the right of direct access from his property to the adjoining high-
way.40 This argument as defined in State Highway Comm'n v. Peters,41
is that:
[P]roperty owners possess the right to direct access to the through
highway; and that while damages are not predicated upon diversion
of traffic from the highway, it is proper to allow damages to be
based on the diversion of the highway from direct access to prop-
erty of the owners.
Another line of authority solely confined to the state of New York,
limits the non-compensable nature of condemnations resulting in
circuity of travel.42 If the access involved is shown to be merely
circuitous, compensation is not required. However, if the facts
established at trial show that access involved is more than merely
circuitous, so that it can be characterized as "unsuitable", compensa-
bility for consequential damages will follow.
43
Despite these few alternative approaches, the overwhelming ma-
37 Palmore, supra note 28, at 744. Judge Palmore, while admitting that the
Court of Appeals has been inclined to refuse recovery for any type of circuity of
travel in the past, expresses doubt that the doctrine will maintain its legal efficacy.
38 Some courts although recognizing and adhering to this principle, have
emphasized that con pensation might still be achieved indirectly. After holding
diversion of traffic and circuity of travel to be non-compensable items in a con-
demnation award, the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Vella, 328 P.2d 941, 945
(Ore. 1958), added:
This is not to say that inconvenience caused the owner of land in the
operation of a business conducted thereon may not be a proper subject
of consideration insofar as it may affect the market value of the remain-
ing property.
The rule is-well stated in 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 163 (1965).
39 See Comment, Freeways and the Rights of Abutting Owners, 3 STAN.. L.
REv. 298, 307 (1951); Comment, Eminent Domain-Recovery for Interference with
Right of Access, 18 S. CAL.. L. Rr~v. 42 (1944).
People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944).
41416 P.2d 390, 895-96 (Wyo. 1966).42 See Priestly v. State, 295 N.Y.S.2d 659, 242 N.E.2d 827 (N.Y. 1968).
43 Snethe Priestly decision, the following cases have supported the awarding
of compensation in circuity of travel-access cases: In re New Police Station House
Pct. 68, 304 N.Y.S.2d 74, 32 App. Div. 2d 1059 (1969); Taylor v. State, 302
N.Y.S.2d 174, 32 App. Div.2d 884 (1969); Argerginger v. State, 299 N.Y.S.2d
882, 32 App. Div.2d 708 (1969); Columbus Holding Corp. v. State, 302 N.Y.S.2d
407, 60 Misc.2d 199 (1969).
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jority of jurisdictions adhere to the view that rerouting of traffc and
the circuity of travel occasioned thereby are legally not compensable.
This dominant approach toward circuity of travel and diversion of
traffic was accepted in the Diuguid decision along with a third well
established doctrine, the non-compensability of restricted access.
The controversy over the compensability of restriction in access
rights stems primarily from judicial ambiguity concerning the pro-
prietary nature of such rights.44 In the late nineteenth century state
legislators became cognizant of the fact that property was not neces-
sarily restricted to the physical thing-land, but rather involved cer-
tain jurally defined rights and privileges arising out of the relation
of owner or another having an interest in land.45 Constitutional amend-
ments gave legal expression to this liberalized concept of property.46
Within this concept it was recognized that the abutting landowner
possessed an "easement" or right of access to the street or highway
immediately appurtenant to his property.47 This right was recognized
as being property in the constitutional sense. Once the courts were
freed from the physical concept of property, however, they faced the
task of defining the limits of this enlarged concept. One of the most
difficult definitions proved to be the area of access rights in the
abutting landowner.
In Kentucky, a landowner has no more than a right of "reasonable
access to the highway system." 48 Any infringement upon convenience
44 See authorities cited in note 4 supra.45 For a thorough account of the historical development of access rights and
their relation to the changing concept of property see Netherton supra note 3.46 Following the lead of the 1870 Illinois legislature, thirty-two states have
recognized that a "taking" does not necessarily have to be physical in nature.
They have adopted "or damaging" provisions which recognize the possibility of
"intangible detriment' to property.
47 See Lane v. San Diego Elec. R. Co., 208 Cal. 29, 280 P. 109, 111 (1929),
where the court held:
An abutting owner has two kinds of rights in a highway, a public right
which he enjoys in common with all other citizens, and certain private
rights which arise from his ownership of property contiguous to the high-
way and which are not common to the public generally.... An abutting
land-owner on a public highway has a special right of easement and user
in the public road for access purposes, and this is a property right which
cannot be damaged or taken away from him without due compensation.48 See Alstyne, supra note 3, at 514. Alstyne presents criteria for use in
determining "reasonableness" of access:
[T]he notion of 'reasonable adequacy' should not be predicated solely
upon an estimate of physical access ability. Rather, it should undertake to
weigh as against the claimed private detriment, the importance of the
underlying governmental objects and the feasibility of possible alterna-
tive means for achieving them as well as the extent to which the claimed
private losses are rationally ascertainable, discernably unique, quantita-
tively significant, administratively manageable, and not compensated by
offsetting benefits.
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of access which does not deprive the owner of "reasonable access"49
falls under the exercise of police power.50 This approach, which is
favored in most jurisdictions and adhered to in Kentucky, is epitomized
by the Kentucky Court of Appeals as follows:
Coming now to the matter of true access rights, it is our opinion
that the only access right the landowner has is a right of reasonable
access to the highway system.... Access is subject to control under
the police power, so the test of reasonableness involves measuring
the benefit of the owner against the hazard and danger to the
traveling public. 51
The continually recurring fact patterns and the court's response
thereto seldom change.5 2 Abutting landowners argue that they have
suffered depreciation in the value of their land as a result of restrictions
upon access. They claim they have suffered a property damage some-
what different in kind from that suffered by the public generally,
and that they should be compensated regardless of whether they con-
tinue to have a reasonable way of ingress and egress. Despite the fact
that property value is depreciated, the court takes an unsympathetic
attitude. Its answer, or basic rationale, is that "the enhancement in
value of land attributable to the mere convenience of the routes of
travel which it enjoys ...is something which does not inure to the
landowner as property."53 The rule has been affirmed and repeated
many times and remains finalized in the recent Diuguid decision.54
49If, however, all available access is taken away or remaining access is unfit
for the finctioning of the owner's property, compensation would be awarded. See
Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Noe, 426 S.W.2d 459 (Ky. 1968); Com-
monwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hess, 420 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1967); Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Claypool, 405 S.W.2d 674 (Ky. 1966); Common-
wealth, Dep't of Highways v. Dotson, 405 S.W.2d 30 (Ky. 1966); Commonwealth,
Dep't of Highways v. AdMins, 396 S.W.2d 768 (Ky. 1965); Commonwealth, Dept
of Highways v. Denny, 885 S.W.2d 776 (Ky. 1964).
GO This rule, by applying the police power, assumes that in our modem com-
plex society, which places great importance upon mobility, private rights that mightimpede transportation advances should be defined at a minimal level.
51 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Carlisle, 363 S.W.2d 104, 107 (Ky.
1962).
r 2 See cases cited at note 24 supra.
53 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Jackson, 302 S.W.2d 373 (Ky. 1957).
54 Stoebuek supra note 3, at 65 suggests that allowing "reasonable access isthe only rational rule of law in the area of restrictions on that right. Praising thequalities of the rule, he writes:
The benefits of the consistent application of this doctrine are manifest.The doctrine is sufficiently flexile to allow expression of the gradual
changes in community consensus. It will therefore greatly assist judges in
the performance of one of their traditional functions-articulating through
their decisions the generally held beliefs of the community. Thus, through
the operation of this doctrine, the law will be able to accommodate the
trend toward reco gnizig a wider range of property rights.Additional support for the reasonable access" doctrine may be found in Clarke,
The Limited Access Highway 27 WAsH. L. lEV. 111 (1952); Covey, Right of
(Continued on next page)
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It simply refuses to recognize that any financial interest stems from
the adjacency of one's property to a public highway.
Each case, standing alone, presents the court with the choice of
aiding necessary completion of highway improvements or redressing
what appears (on a single case basis) to be an isolated economic
injustice to the individual. But viewing this body of law as a whole,
it reveals a substantial injustice to property owners.
A few state courts have recognized the inherent injustice in
consistently viewing the public interest as superior to the rights of the
abutting landowner. 5 Though admittedly a minority, they have held as
a matter of law that there is a taking wherever the owner has not been
left reasonable access from the remainder of his land.50 The public
interest is still protected without the patent injustice which results to
the individual property owner when the majority approach is applied.
The fact that other means of access to the property are available
affects merely the amount of damages, not the right of recovery.
57
Implicit in the majority approach is the court's acceptance of the
"suitability" of various modes of substituted access notwithstanding
the obvious quantitative and qualitative diminution of access rights
resulting from the substitution for the prior unlimited access. The
finding of "access in fact" is thus sufficient to totally deny recovery
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Access and the Illinois Highway Program, 47 ILL. B.J. 634 (1958-59); Covey,
Frontage Roads: To Compensate or Not to Compensate, 56 Nw. U.L. REV. 587
(1961); Covey, Highway Protection Through Control of Access and Roadside
Development, 1959 Wxs. L. REv. 567 (1959); Tate, Legal Criteria of Damages and
Benefits-The Measurement of Taking-Caused Damages to Untaken Property, 31
LA. L. REv. 431 (1971); Note, Substantial Impairment: A Standard of Recovery
for Deprivation of Access, 22 BAYLOR L. RiEv. 404 (1970).
55 See People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944); Sease v. City
of Spartanburg, 131 S.W.2d 683 (S.C. 1963); State Highway Commr v. Peters,
416 P.2d 390 (Wyo. 1966).56 In People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1944), the property
involved fronted the highway a short distance from a grade crossing constructed
on the adacent highway by state agencies. In order to eliminate the grade
crossing, the major portion of the highway was diverted underground a short
distance from the intersection, but attained the level of the injured property a
short distance beyond it. In order that the owner might not be deprived of
access to his property, local service roads were constructed on both sides of the
underpass. As a result, the property, which had formerly fronted directly upon the
main highway found itself adjoining a service road 30 feet wide and thereby
separated from the main highway. The court atrmed a judgement for damages
"based on diversion of the highway from direct access to the defendants property."
The landowner no longer had direct access to the highway which hax formerly
lain immediately contiguous to his property.
57 Sease v. City of Spartanburg, 131 S.E.2d 683, 686 (S.C. 1963). Where
the court finds a compensable loss of access, the compensation generally allowed
is the difference in the market value of the property with and without the right
of access. See 29 C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 105.
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without regard to the probable diminution in quantity and quality of
access. The minority approach takes into consideration the quantitative
variation and degree involved in access restrictions and provides a
needed method for compensation. The Kentucky Court of Appeals
has not totally ignored the merit in this approach, but policy con-
siderations have tended to obscure and diminish its appeal. One mem-
ber of the bench, however, has condemned the logic of the "reasonable
access" test and voiced his approval of the minority approach. Judge
Osborne, concurring in the case of Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways
v. Carlisle,58 noted:
[W]here loss of access diminishes the value of property, it should
be compensable. I am unable to understand the logic that permits
one landowner to recover when there is 99% loss of access and
denies recovery to another where there is 95% loss. To me, loss of
access either is or is not compensable. 59
Relating this opinion to an earlier one,60 he further noted:
The owner of property either has a compensable interest in its
adjacency to the highway or he does not. If he does, then any act
that diminished the access should be compensable. . . .I believe
the owners have a property interest in the adjacency of their land
to an open access highway and therefore I would compensate
them for any loss of value suffered as a result of curtailing or
limiting access. 61
Although a more equitable alternative is available, the denial of
compensation for "reasonable restriction of access" will in all prob-
ability maintain its entrenched position in Kentucky as witnessed by
the court's eager application in Diuguid.62 The reason for continued
judicial approval of the non-compensability of circuity of travel,
rerouting of traffic and reasonable restriction of access, is the policy
that underlies these doctrines. An analysis, therefore, of policy con-
siderations is imperative.
It appears rather obvious that the doctrines merely explain policy
decisions to deny compensation for certain governmental taking of
property. Denial of compensation does not conform to the realities
of market value. But it does bear witness to a judicial opinion that
certain types of losses must be borne by landowners rather than the
traveling public. This opinion frustrates the rights of abutting land-
owners in order to prevent additional expansion of public liability in
Gs 442 S.W.2d 294 (Ky. 1969).
59 Id. at 298.
60 Commonwealth, Dep't of Highways v. Hess, 420 S.W.2d 660 (Ky. 1967).
01 Id. at 664.
62 469 S.W.2d 707 (1971).
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an area where fantastic costs are already hurting the public coffers.
Thus the courts, through the doctrine of stare decisis, continue to
prevent redefinition of the limits of compensation in loss of access
cases. It is argued that although some inequity presently exists,
predictability is to be considered a virtue of some value and that a
complete body of law, developed over many decades, has a certain
correctness in and of itself.
Certainly, the most forceful method of demonstrating the desir-
ability of redefinition and change in the law as it relates to deprivation
of access is to consider the shortcomings of the policy arguments
advanced to support the present status of the law.
In one policy argument,63 the abutter is said to be on notice when
he purchases his property that the road may be replaced sometime
in the future. In terms of reality and practicality this argument is
unsound. No appraiser discounts the value of highway abutting
property by the probability that in the future it will no longer abut.
Even if such were the case, the probability is incalculable. Loss of
access is an extremely remote possibility that does not enter into the
formulation of the market price of abutting property.
64
A second policy argument is that the sovereign is in the same
position as any other neighbor who possesses the absolute privilege
to remove improvements which are highly beneficial to his neighbor's
property.65 This argument fails to consider the unique relationship
between the citizen-abutting landowner and his government. This
relationship differs from that of private neighbors. An argument
often espoused is that a landowner who sells a strip of land to a
private party, loses all rights of access across it. It is suggested that
the same result occurs when the state is the purchaser. This argument
is fallacious for two reasons. First, the abutting landowner is not
forced to sell a strip of land to a private neighbor. Second, if he did
decide to sell, he would take the loss of access into account in ascer-
taining the sales price.66
Perhaps the most convincing policy argument, alluded to through-
out this comment, is that courts must recognize the practical difficul-
ties borne by the sovereign in paying the cost of highway improve-
ments and balance the interests of the abutting landowner and the
traveling public. Although that balance is weighted in favor of the
63 Note, Eminent Domain-Just Compensation-Diversion of Traffic Considered
in Awarding Damages, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 202, 205 (1959), citing Paul v. Carter,
24 Pa. 207 (1885). But see Note, 12 ALBANY L.J. 53, 54-55 (1875).64 Mayberry and Aloi, supra note 3, at 646.
65 Sax, Taking and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 74 (1964).
66 Mayberry and Aloi supra note 8, at 646.
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traveling public, 7 it seems that it should be expected to bear the
costs, via the sovereign, of any improvement it makes for its own
benefit. As Judge Palmore stated:
The public treasury ought not to be preserved by a process of
discrimination that is inconsistent with the principles under which
it was created.68
This country and its state and municipal instrumentalities would
not, under different circumstances, tolerate the deprivation of one's
livelihood under the guise of the police power. Yet this is exactly
what has happened in many deprivation of access cases e.g. Diuguid.69
Current legal techniques for adjusting claims of the abutting land-
owner are clearly inadequate and should be revised. Accepted doc-
trines for allocating the costs of improving transportation are too often
translated into uncompensated financial losses in the form of diminished
property values. The needed revision is not going to be the product
of evolution through the judicial process. The crucial question of who
should bear the cost of change deserves a rationally developed
legislative response. The legislature in formulating that response must
seek to strike a fair and just balance between the public interest in
transportation improvements and the private interest in distributive
justice.
Clyde L. Kuehn
67 Dubaine, Limited Access Highways, 330 OnE. L. REv. 16, 40 (1953).68 Palmore, supra note 28, at 750.
69 See Mayberry and Aloi, supra note 3; Alstye, supra note 3. Both articles
suggest that the only rational solution to the problem of restricting access rights is
constitutional amendment or statutory change.
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